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ABSTRACT 
Both insiders and analysts are involved in the collection and dissemination of 
information to the market, roles which impact heavily on price efficiency and resource 
allocation. The differences between the two groups, however, result in a competitive 
relationship with analysts at a disadvantage as they face greater costs associated 
with information gathering. As a result they may choose not to participate in a one-
sided competition. We employ transaction data to examine the impact of firm-year 
aggregate insider trading intensity on the level of analyst following. We find a 
negative relationship between insider trading intensity and analyst coverage. This 
result was driven by large blockholders suggesting that analysts are attracted to 
higher levels of information asymmetry from which they profit.  
 
JEL Codes : G14, G38, C24, C25 
Keywords: Analyst Following, Insider Trading, Disclosure, Informational Asymmetry 
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INTRODUCTION 
The information gathering activities of brokerage firms and analysts are considered 
crucial to the efficient and smooth running of the financial markets (Lang, Lins and 
Miller, 2003; Coffee, 2002). To forecast and evaluate company prospects accurately 
analysts collect information from numerous and divergent sources. During this 
process they act as information conduits, passing the collected information onto the 
market and increasing the information content of prices (Dempsey, 1989; Lobo and 
Mahmoud, 1989; Kim, Lin and Slovin, 1997). The role analysts play in insuring the 
accuracy of share prices has effects on the allocation of resources within the market. 
Efficient allocations require the price to be an accurate reflection of the future payoffs 
and this can only be achieved if all available information is discounted. If prices do 
not incorporate all available information then expectations of the future will be 
misleading and result in resources being misallocated by the firm, its competitors and 
the market (Khanna and Slezak, 1994). Therefore, all efforts must be made to ensure 
that prices reflect all available information so as to mitigate the possible adverse 
private and social consequences. In particular, factors inhibiting analysts coverage 
should be identified and eliminated.  
 
A great deal of research has been conducted determining factors that increase 
or decrease analyst following (O’Brien and Bhushan, 1990; Hong, Lim and Stein, 
2000; Chang, Khanna and Palepu, 2000). One strand of the literature in particular 
has looked at the interactions between insiders and investment advisors. Insiders by 
definition have access to price-sensitive non-public information regarding their 
company which allows them to value the securities of their firms more accurately 
(Friederich, Gregory, Matako and Tonks, 2002). Other investors, including informed 
outsiders, are limited to information that is already in the public domain. The other 
important aspect of this informational superiority is that it is acquired at little cost as a 
result of the insider’s position within the company (Fishman and Hagerty, 1992). This 
is in direct contrast to the position of analysts whose information has expenses both 
in terms of cost and time. The insider’s advantage has inspired several models which 
conclude that insiders may crowd out analysts from the market.  
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Haddock and Macey (1987) were the first to argue that the rivalry for trading 
profits between insiders and stock market professionals may be fierce and the parties 
may resort to such actions as advocating for preferential SEC regulations in the US. 
In subsequent papers, Fishman and Hagerty (1992) and Khanna and Slezak (1994) 
provided theoretical frameworks assessing the impact of insider trading on informed 
outsiders. Both models were based on the premise that analysts’ information is costly 
and the efforts to gather information will be undertaken only if the perceived expected 
return, or the marginal benefit from analyzing the company, will outweigh the 
expense. The cost benefit analysis is influenced by several factors. Competition in 
the collection of unpriced information increases with the number of investment 
advisors resulting in improved price efficiency. However, the expected benefit of 
equity research diminishes at the same time, reducing the incentive to gather 
information. At an equilibrium point the marginal cost of following a company should 
be exactly equal the expected return (Fishman and Hagerty, 1992).  
 
The introduction of insiders into the models of Khanna and Slezak (1994) and 
Fishman and Hagerty (1992) has a major effect on the equilibrium number of 
analysts. Dealing by insiders, who by the virtue of their employment or ownership, 
have access to high quality information at little cost reduces the expected return to 
informed outsiders for two reasons. First, part of the inside information being traded 
on will be partially revealed to the market before it is publicly disclosed (Kyle, 1985; 
Leland, 1992). The smaller the difference between the correct and market prices for 
a security the weaker the drive of market professionals to exploit it. Second, despite 
significant equity research costs, analysts or their clients can still incur losses should 
they trade against a better-informed insider. Intuitively, expected returns should be 
negatively related to the frequency of insider trading and empirically an inverse 
relationship between analyst following and a proxy of insider trading prevalence is 
likely to be observed. 
 
This relationship has been investigated at the country level and established to 
a degree by Bushman, Piotroski and Smith (2003). However, rather than use 
information on the actual level of insider trading within a country the authors focused 
on the impact of insider trading regulations. This has been done by examining the 
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effect of the initial enactment and enforcement of insider trading laws on analyst 
coverage. The dataset was based on the sample employed by Bhattacharya and 
Daouk (2002). However, as pointed out in that study the enforcement measure only 
specifies the first enforcement date rather than the enforcement frequency. The 
results in Bushman et al. (2003) do nevertheless lend support to the crowding out 
hypothesis. The authors found that overall analyst coverage increases in response to 
the first enforcement activity, an action that they argued reduced the insider trading 
incidence. They found little reaction to the introduction of insider trading laws, largely 
due to emerging market countries that have difficulty convincing market participants 
that they will enforce the enacted regulations. 
 
This paper seeks to extend upon the empirical support for the crowding out 
hypothesis and to determine whether the conclusions reached in the cross-country 
analysis of Bushman et al. (2003) hold at the firm level. However, unlike Bushman et 
al. (2003), we use disclosed insider transactions to construct our proxy of insider 
trading prevalence. The relationship between insiders and analysts has been 
examined in the context of New Zealand market using both count data models and 
censored regressions. We conclude that as per the previous study of Etebari, 
Tourani-Rad and Gilbert (2003) insider trading profitability was largely due to director 
transactions, with substantial shareholder trades being profitable only in the long-run. 
After controlling for a number of determinants, a significant negative relationship 
between analyst coverage and the probability trading against an insider was found. 
This finding, however, was mostly driven by substantial shareholder trades. This 
suggests that the delayed disclosure by directors prolonged information asymmetry 
making it profitable for analysts to continue collecting information.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the sample 
and variables employed in this study while Section 3 sets out the methodological 
framework. Section 4 presents and elaborates upon the main results from our testing 
and Section 4 concludes.   
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DATA AND VARIABLES 
The study employs a sample of companies listed on the New Zealand Exchange 
(NZX) between 1997 and 2003. For a company to be included the transactions of 
both substantial shareholders, those holding more than 5% of the voting rights in the 
company, and directors had to be available for the period under investigation. 
Substantial shareholder trades were gathered from the NZX while director trades 
were collected from company annual reports. This resulted in a sample of 83 
companies, 464 firm-years and 2880 insider trades. Information on analyst following 
has been obtained from Datex, a local source that focuses on New Zealand and 
Australian companies. In any given year Datex carries analyst forecasts on 
approximately 60 New Zealand companies.  
 
Two measures of analyst following were constructed to act as the dependent 
variables. The first was the number of analyst forecasts available for a company at 
the end of the calendar year (Analysts). The second measure was the percentage of 
the total number of analysts following companies that had provided an analyst 
forecast for the company in question by December of each year (Analysts_F). The 
scaling procedure, which limits the value to between zero and one, was employed 
due to a noticeable reduction in the number of investment advisors covering New 
Zealand companies. The insider trading variable (INS) employed was constructed by 
adding the volume of all insider transactions for both directors and substantial 
shareholders and then dividing by the total volume of trading in a given calendar 
year. Intuitively, this measure represents the probability of trading against an insider.  
 
In order to isolate the impact of insider trading, a number of additional 
variables were also constructed to control for factors that have been established in 
the literature as affecting analyst following. Analysts tend to focus on larger (Atiase, 
1985; Freeman, 1987; Bhushan, 1989), and more liquid companies (Dahlquist, 
Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson, 2003) when producing forecasts, factors which are 
controlled for by using size and turnover variables. Size is the natural logarithm of the 
companies average market capitalization per year while Turnover is the total volume 
traded per year divided by the average number of shares outstanding.  
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We also control for any potential bias against companies that have 
unpredictable earnings. Ang and Ciccone (2001) point out that analysts may avoid 
companies where the earnings are difficult to predict due to rapid growth. Several 
proxies were considered to identify growth firms including the earnings-to-price ratio 
(E/P) and the price-to-cashflow ratio (P/CF), all calculated at year end. As per the 
findings of Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) in the US and Chin, Prevost and 
Gottesman (2002) in New Zealand we did not consider the book-to-market ratio 
employing P/CF and E/P ratios instead. The final model specification employs only 
the P/CF variable as it proved to be marginally stronger than the E/P ratio although 
the results overall were similar. A leverage variable (Leverage) was included, 
measured as the companies debt-to-equity ratio at the end of the calendar year. This 
variable was used to control for the default risk of the company. Given the significant 
costs of equity research, analysts are unlikely to gather information about companies 
in financial distress as there is a higher probability they will be unable to exploit it.  
 
Several papers have also noted that analysts tend to avoid companies with a 
high risk of extreme agency costs as manifested by concentrated share ownership 
(Chang, Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Lang et al., 2003) and weak corporate 
governance (Bushman et al., (2003). Lang et al. (2003) in particular found that 
concentrated ownership by the family and management sub-group resulted in 
reduced analyst coverage while other types of concentrated ownership including 
government ownership had no effect. This is particularly important in the context of 
the New Zealand market where the companies have over time become very tightly 
held, with the majority of New Zealand companies having over 50% institutional 
ownership (Fitzsimons, 1997; Fox and Walker, 1996). This situation, in light of the 
finding by Lang et al. (2003), suggests that concentrated share ownership could have 
an impact on analysts following. As such we included a variable to measure the level 
of institutional holdings in a company (Inst), measured as the percentage of holdings 
of the substantial shareholders in the company after controlling for potential double 
reporting of relevant interests. Furthermore, the independence of the board of 
directors (Indep), defined as the proportion of the board that are classed as non-
executive or independent directors has been included. Indep is used to proxy firm-
level corporate governance, as increased levels of independent directors improves 
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monitoring of executive decision-making and, thereby, enhances corporate 
transparency.  
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 25th Percentile Median 75th Percentile 
Analysts 2.7909 3.2982 0.0000 1.0000 5.0000 
Analysts_F 0.3317 0.3669 0.0000 0.1429 0.7000 
INS 0.0683 0.2843 0.0000 0.0026 0.0306 
Size 11.4899 1.8505 10.2560 11.3787 12.5798 
Turnover 0.2520 0.3067 0.0784 0.1712 0.3149 
Leverage 0.7972 1.8634 0.0985 0.3060 0.7025 
P/CF 9.7460 80.3671 4.2000 7.6700 11.8300 
Inst 0.5524 0.2082 0.4001 0.5632 0.6998 
Indep 0.7938 0.1581 0.7000 0.8333 0.8750 
DGDP 0.0283 0.0171 0.0244 0.0310 0.0391 
Confid 9.2857 20.4226 -4.8500 5.8000 20.2000 
Market_Size 17.6930 0.0922 17.6011 17.7206 17.7420 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1 Notes –Analysts is the number of analyst’s forecasts per company available at the end 
of the year.  Analysts_F is the number of analyst’s forecasts available at year end as a 
percentage of the total number of analysts.  INS is the total volume of aggregated insider 
trading (directors and substantial shareholders trades) per firm-year divided by the total 
volume traded in that firm-year. Size is the natural logarithm of the average market value of 
equity during the firm-year. Turnover is measured as the volume traded in a firm-year divided 
by the average shares outstanding. Leverage is the debt to equity ratio at the end of the 
calendar year. P/CF is price divided by cash flow at the end of the calendar year. Inst is the 
percentage of shares held by institutional shareholders, defined as substantial shareholders, 
as per the Securities Market Act 1988, corrected for duplicate reported relevant interests. 
Indep is the percentage of the board of directors that are classified as non-executive or 
independent directors. dGDP is the annual percentage change in real GDP. Confid is the 
calendar year end value of the net business confidence index (%improve/rise - 
%worsen/decline). Market_Size is the natural logarithm of the calendar year end market 
capitalisation for all companies on the New Zealand Stock Exchange.  
 
The Datex analyst forecast data showed a declining number of analysts 
producing forecasts for New Zealand companies.1 This trend is controlled for in two 
ways, firstly by including a time trend variable, Time. The second approach is the 
inclusion of three further variables in the regressions to account for potential 
macroeconomic and market-wide causes of the declining number of analysts. These 
variables are the annual real GDP growth rate (dGDP), the natural logarithm of the 
market capitalization of the NZSX (Market_Size), both measured at the end of the 
calendar year, and the general business confidence index (Confid). Business 
confidence data was collected from the National Bank of New Zealand and is based 
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on the results of a monthly survey of 1500 businesses nationwide. It is defined as the 
percentage of participants who believe that business conditions will rise/improve over 
the next 12 months less the percentage who believe the economy will 
decline/worsen. We use year end values to measure the level of confidence. Price, 
volume, leverage, P/CF, market size and GDP were collected from Thompson 
Financials Datastream. Information on institutional holdings and the independence of 
the board came from the company annual reports.   
 
Summary statistics on the variables to be employed in our models are given in 
Table 1. As can be seen there are on average 2.79 analysts covering a company 
over a sample year. This mean is similar to that found in Bushman et al. (2003) for 
100 countries, 2.58. On average, companies were followed by 33.17% of the total 
number of analysts active in the New Zealand market. It has to be noted that 49% of 
the firm-years do not have any analysts following the company. The INS variable has 
a mean of 6.83% indicating that on average an outsider has more than a 6% chance 
of trading against an inherently better-informed insider. Studies in other markets have 
found much smaller percentages. Bettis, Cole and Lemmon (2000), for instance, 
found that in the US insider trades make up just 0.66% of daily share trading in 
allowed periods, less than 1/10 of the relative trading volume observed in our 
sample. The large sample mean of INS can likely be ascribed to the lack of vigorous 
enforcement of insider trading sanctions and low liquidity of the New Zealand market 
in general.  
 
The untransformed mean (median) market value of equity is NZ$ 525 million 
(NZ$ 87 million) and a log transformation has been used to reduce the skewness of 
the data. These numbers are lower than those reported for other developed markets 
and the discrepancy between the mean and the median attests to the fact that the 
sample includes both small and large companies. The turnover variable shows that 
on average the sample companies traded 25% of the outstanding shares each year, 
although the range is wide including both highly liquid and illiquid companies. The 
P/CF variable has an average of 9.74 and a median of 7.67. The institutional holding 
variable (Inst) and independence of the board (Indep) have means of 55.24% and 
79.38% respectively, values that are not too different from the median values. This 
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shows that New Zealand companies are more tightly held than particularly US 
companies which tend to have widespread ownership. The results also suggest that 
New Zealand firms are controlled by boards with a majority of independent directors. 
The average growth rate of real GDP over the sample period was 2.8% while the 
number of businesses that were optimistic exceeded the number pessimistic 
respondents by 9% on average. The average log size of the market was 17.69, which 
is equivalent to NZ$ 48,302 million in dollar terms. 
 
Table 2 shows the cross-correlations between variables. The two analyst 
measures are, by construction, strongly correlated and both covariate negatively with 
INS. This provides some support for the hypothesis that insider trading crowds out 
analysts. It should be noted, however, that the univariate correlation coefficients are 
indicative measures only. The data also reveals a strong analyst preference for large 
and liquid companies. The significantly positive link between the independence of the 
board and analysts confirms the view that market professionals do prefer to avoid 
companies with potential for agency problems. As predicted by Lang et al. (2003) in 
light of the concentrated nature of firms’ shareholdings in New Zealand we find a 
negative correlation between institutional holdings and Analysts. The inverse 
relationship between institutional holdings and turnover predictably indicates that 
higher levels of institutional holdings lead to less turnover. The strong positive link 
between Analysts, business confidence and market size suggests that analysts are 
more active when the market is growing and when confidence is high.  
 
Table 2 also showed a positive relationship between Size and Turnover as 
well as P/CF and Indep implying that larger companies are more liquid, and value 
companies tend to have more developed board structures. Turnover expectedly co-
moved with market size, demonstrating that liquidity is higher in times of prosperity. 
An interesting result is the negative relationships between business confidence and 
both change in GDP and market size which suggests that business confidence falls 
when the market and economy do well. This may be explained by the expectation 
that central banks will act to control inflationary pressures by raising the nominal 
interest rates which will lead to slower growth in the next period. We do, however, 
see the predicted positive relationship between change in dGDP and Market_Size.  
 0 
Note - The sample contains 464 company-years from 1997 to 2003. The p-values are shown in parentheses. Analysts is the number of analyst’s forecasts per
company available at the end of the year.  Analysts_F is the number of analyst’s forecasts available at year end as a percentage of the total number of
analysts.  INS is the total volume of aggregated insider trading (directors and substantial shareholders trades) per firm-year divided by the total volume traded
in that firm-year. Size is the natural logarithm of the average market value of equity during the firm-year. Turnover is measured as the volume traded in a firm-
year divided by the average shares outstanding. Leverage is the debt to equity ratio at the end of the calendar year. P/CF is price divided by cash flow at the
end of the calendar year. Inst is the percentage of shares held by institutional shareholders, defined as substantial shareholders, as per the Securities Market
Act 1988, corrected for duplicate reported relevant interests. Indep is the percentage of the board of directors that are classified as non-executive or
independent directors. dGDP is the annual percentage change in real GDP. Confid is the calendar year end value of the net business confidence index
(%improve/rise - %worsen/decline). Market_Size is the natural logarithm of the calendar year end market capitalisation for all companies on the New Zealand
Stock Exchange 
 Analysts_F INS Size Turnover Leverage P/CF Inst Indep dGDP Confid Market_Size 
Analysts 0.9454 
(0.0000) 
-0.0782 
(0.0924) 
0.6729 
(0.0000) 
0.3102 
(0.0000) 
-0.0190 
(0.6827) 
0.0421 
(0.3658) 
-0.0802 
(0.0845) 
0.1075 
(0.0206) 
-0.0158 
(0.7341) 
0.1853 
(0.0001) 
0.0849 
(0.0676) 
Analysts_F 1.0000 -0.1009 
(0.0297) 
0.7355 
(0.0000) 
0.3057 
(0.0000) 
-0.0335 
(0.4717) 
0.0444 
(0.3395) 
-0.0703 
(0.1303) 
0.1160 
(0.0124) 
0.0019 
(0.9669) 
0.0122 
(0.7936) 
0.0035 
(0.4879) 
INS  1.0000 -0.0002 
(0.9967) 
-0.0845 
(0.0690) 
-0.0099 
(0.8322) 
-0.0011 
(0.9812) 
0.0701 
(0.1314) 
-0.0308 
(0.5088) 
0.0028 
(0.9518) 
0.1305 
(0.0049) 
0.0219 
(0.6382) 
Size   1.0000 0.1180 
(0.0110) 
-0.0114 
(0.8066) 
0.1098 
(0.0180) 
-0.0328 
(0.4808) 
0.1276 
(0.0059) 
0.0509 
(0.2738) 
-0.0888 
(0.0558) 
0.0017 
(0.9704) 
Turnover    1.0000 -0.0186 
(0.6896) 
-0.2365 
(0.0000) 
-0.3257 
(0.0000) 
-0.0146 
(0.7545) 
0.0096 
(0.8363) 
0.0657 
(0.1580) 
0.0820 
(0.0775) 
Leverage     1.0000 0.0190 
(0.6838) 
0.0696 
(0.1342) 
-0.0527 
(0.2572) 
-0.0706 
(0.1289) 
0.0751 
(0.1062) 
-0.0333 
(0.4741) 
P/CF      1.0000 -0.0122 
(0.7931) 
0.1495 
(0.0012) 
-0.0113 
(0.8077) 
0.0017 
(0.9704) 
-0.1041 
(0.0249) 
Inst       1.0000 0.0929 
(0.0455) 
-0.0162 
(0.7273) 
0.0300 
(0.5196) 
-0.0029 
(0.9501) 
Indep        1.0000 0.0009 
(0.9852) 
0.0512 
(0.2711) 
0.0353 
(0.4486) 
DGDP         1.0000 -0.4807 
(0.0000) 
0.4512 
(0.0000) 
Confid          1.0000 -0.1356 
(0.0034) 
Table 2: Sample Cross-Correlations 
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METHODOLOGY 
To determine whether corporate insiders are able to trade profitably as a result of 
their access to preferential information we employ event study analysis. Specifically, 
the continuously compounded returns accruing to insiders over a pre-specified 
horizon were calculated and adjusted for the market movements. An equally-
weighted, all share index, NZSE ALL, was chosen to represent the market portfolio. 
The market-adjusted returns were then aggregated in the time dimension and 
averaged across all trades.  
 
The statistical significance of excess insider returns is tested using bootstrap 
methodology which was introduced by Efron (1979) and applied in the context of 
event studies by Foster, Olsen and Shelvin (1984) and Wisniewski and Bohl (2004). 
Specifically, from the entire population of companies and dates we randomly select 
with replacement a firm-date pair to match each of the insider purchases and sales 
from our initial sample. The cumulative abnormal returns following each of these 
random events are then computed for the respective event windows and aggregated. 
This process is repeated numerous times to develop an accurate empirical 
distribution of the abnormal returns under the null hypothesis. In our testing we use 
2000 repetitions to develop the distribution. The null is rejected at the α percent level 
if the abnormal return from the insider trading sample exceeds (1−α)*2,000 simulated 
values from the empirical distribution. The bootstrap testing procedure is deemed 
relatively robust to the problems of non-normality, heteroscedasticity and time 
dependence of security returns as it avoids many distributional assumptions of 
parametric tests (Kramer, 2001). 
 
 In addition to the bootstrap p-values, nonparametric sign test statistics were 
computed. Under the null hypothesis that insiders do not exploit preferential 
information in their share dealings the probability that prices will move abnormally in 
the direction of their trade should be a half. The test statistic, based on the deviation 
from the 0.5 benchmark, is asymptotically normal 
 
)1,0(~)5.0(2 NpNz −=                                     [1] 
10 
 
where the parameter p = Pr(CARi > 0Tradei = Purchase) + Pr(CARi < 0Tradei = 
Sale) is estimated directly from the sample. N is the total number of trades. 
 
The next stage of our empirical inquiry pinpoints the determinants of analyst 
following. Since Analysts is a non-negative integer variable the normal linear model 
will tend to give inconsistent estimators of the true model parameters (Winkelmann, 
2000). The final model specification therefore needs to take the count feature of the 
regressant into account. Furthermore, an inspection of the analyst following data 
uncovers that the zero outcome is underpredicted by all of the conventional count 
data distributions as almost 49% of the firm-years were not covered by market 
professionals. An econometric specification which is potentially able to accommodate 
both of the aforementioned data characteristics has been introduced by Lambert 
(1992), who studied the number of defects in manufacturing. More specifically, her 
zero-inflated Poisson regressions (ZIP) are suitable for a count generating process 
exhibiting excess of zeros.  
 
In ZIP specification, the zero outcome can arise from two different regimes. In 
the first regime the outcome is always zero, whereas in the second regime the 
nonoccurrence can arise from the Poisson process. In other words, the Poisson is 
mixed with point mass at zero, i.e.   
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With little a priori information about common covariates that affect both the Poisson 
mean λ and the probability π a natural parameterization is 
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where τ is a shape parameter. The log transformation of λ and the logit splitting 
model have been used to linearize the Poisson means and Bernoulli probabilities of 
success. The parameter j takes the value of one in Models 1 and 3, with the 
Trend_Variable being a simple time trend. In the two remaining model specification j 
= 3 with dGDP, Confid and Market_Size capturing the trends and cyclical variation. 
The Newton-Raphson algorithm has been used to maximize the following ZIP 
log-likelihood function 
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The ZIP model induces overdispersion which, given the mean and variance of 
Analysts, may suggest that it is a more accurate description of the data relative to an 
unaltered Poisson. A direct test is called for, but the testing procedure is complicated 
by the fact that ZIP is not nested within the Poisson model. In his seminal paper, 
Vuong (1989) developed general tests for nonnested models which were 
subsequently implemented by Greene (1994) to test the ZIP model versus the 
unaltered alternative. The extremely large positive values of the directional Vuong 
statistics in all of our model specifications attest to the appropriateness of the ZIP 
specification. 
 
 Due to the declining number of investment advisors in general, the analyst 
following has been expressed as a percentage of the total number of analysts active 
on the New Zealand market in a given calendar year (Analysts_F). By construction, 
this variable lies between zero and one with a significant proportion of observations 
being concentrated at these limiting values. The classical regression, however, 
dismisses the notion of qualitative difference between limit and nonlimit observations. 
A suitable model, which has been frequently applied to sample data which is a 
mixture of continuous and discrete distributions, is the censored regression model of 
Tobin (1958). We specify the doubly censored Tobit regression as follows 
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 where Index is a latent variable and the regressors included in the x matrix are 
the same as in equation [3]. 
The corresponding log-likelihood function 
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is maximized using the Olsen’s (1978) reparametrization.  
RESULTS 
Insider trading has been shown to be profitable in nearly all the markets studied, 
including markets perceived to be extremely well regulated.2 Intuitively, insiders, who 
are in a position of informational superiority, have a clear advantage over uninformed 
investors against whom they trade. This gives them the ability to conduct well-timed 
transactions and reap significant abnormal returns. However, as pointed out by 
Fishman and Hagerty (1992) deregulation of insider trading can lead to a reduction in 
profits accruing to market professionals as their information becomes less valuable 
and should they trade against an insider their losses could be substantial. This leads 
outsiders to reduce the amount of resources they are prepared to invest in acquiring 
information to inform their decision making and may, in turn, reduce the informational 
efficiency of the market. If insiders are not required to disclose and the market is 
unable to detect their trading this problem can be further exacerbated and the 
information being traded on is not impounded into the price. This means that 
outsiders, and analysts in particular, are likely to continue expending resources to 
gather information in situations where the market should already have impounded it 
in the price. In essence the market is allocating resources on the basis of less 
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accurate and informed prices than would be the case if insider trades have been 
disclosed.  
 
We firstly examine the profitability of insider transactions to determine whether 
insiders exploit the informational advantage they possess. Table 3 reports the 
cumulative abnormal returns, equivalent to the profits expropriated by insiders. Panel 
A examines the CARs for all declared insider dealing, both directors and substantial 
shareholders. The results show that insiders make abnormal returns of 1.7% above 
the market benchmark over the first 50 days following the trade. The returns increase 
monotonically peaking at 5.01% by the 200 day event window. All of the values are 
significant at the 1% level. This finding is supported by the sign test results which 
indicate that over the four considered event windows most of the trades were in the 
predicted direction. The results, therefore, lend support to the assertion that insiders 
are earning significant abnormal returns and are not concerned with concealing this 
fact by engaging in camouflaging their trades, i.e. trading small volumes against the 
predicted direction of the market reaction to news in order to confuse regulators.  
 
When the results are separated by the class of insider notable differences in 
the profitability of trading emerge. The figures for directors in Panel B show that all 
transactions earned highly significant abnormal returns over all the event windows. 
The magnitude of the undue gains is striking, peaking at almost 7% for the longest 
considered investment horizon. The CARs are also of a greater magnitude than for 
the aggregated sample by 1% over the first window, growing to 1.8% for the 200 day 
period. The sign test statistics support the significance of CARs and the 
corresponding p-values are markedly low. The results in Panel C for substantial 
shareholders, however, are in stark contrast to those in Panels A and B. Only in the 
final event window do substantial shareholders earn statistically significant CARs at 
the 10% level. The sign test results are also unable to reject the null hypothesis in all 
cases. 
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Panel A: Aggregated Sample Cumulative Abnormal Returns  
Event Windows CARs   Bootstrap 
   p-values 
Sign Test Sign Test   p-values 
0,50 0.0170 0.0020  3.7237 0.0001 
0,100 0.0302 0.0000  5.3220 0.0000 
0,150 0.0422 0.0000  4.7833 0.0000 
0,200 0.0501 0.0000  4.3061 0.0000 
      
Panel B: Director Transactions Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Event Windows CARs   Bootstrap 
   p-values 
Sign Test Sign Test   p-values 
0,50 0.0270 0.0000  4.8040 0.0000 
0,100 0.0472 0.0000  6.5050 0.0000 
0,150 0.0664 0.0000  6.1124 0.0000 
0,200 0.0683 0.0000  5.7885 0.0000 
      
Panel C: Substantial Shareholder Transactions Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Event Windows CARs   Bootstrap 
   p-values 
Sign Test Sign Test   p-values 
0,50 0.0023 0.3045  0.0332 0.4868 
0,100 0.0057 0.2405  0.5014 0.3080 
0,150 0.0091 0.1810  0.2694 0.3938 
0,200 0.0163 0.0710  0.5828 0.2800 
     
Table 3: Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 
Note- The CARs were calculated using a market adjusted model against the NZSE ALL. The 
Bootstrap p-values were calculated by employing the Bootstrap methodology described in Section 3. 
The sign test statistics calculated in accordance with equation [1] and the corresponding p-values are 
reported in columns 4 and 5, respectively. 
 
Several rationalizations of the difference in profitability between large 
blockholders and director trades can be propounded. The first, as explained in 
Etebari, Tourani-Rad and Gilbert (2003), is the difference in the disclosure regimes 
that existed until recently. Under the Security Markets Act 1988 directors were only 
required to disclosure their transactions in the annual reports, a delay on average of 
9-10 months. Substantial shareholders, on the other hand, are required to disclose 
the details of their trades within 5 working days of the transaction. The ability to delay 
disclosure leads to ongoing profits as the market is not informed of the director’s 
trade and therefore the insiders information is not included in the pricing of the share 
(Huddart, Hughes and Levine, 2001). This allows later trades to be made on the 
same information with the same advantage whereas substantial shareholders have 
only a short window in which to profit. The other reason, as has been argued by 
Lakonishok and Lee (2001) and Seyhun (2000), is that blockholders do not have the 
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same access to information as a result of not having continuous input into the 
company operations and therefore tend to profit less than directors and executives. 
 
Overall, the results confirm decisively that insider trading is profitable for all 
insiders in the long-run, although directors who can delay their disclosure are able to 
earn greater returns over all event windows. Informed investors such as analysts are 
likely to be aware of their disadvantage in relation to insiders and therefore minimize 
the probability of trading against them. One would consequently expect to find that 
the presence of insiders crowds out analysts. 
 
This hypothesis that the presence of insiders reduces analysts following is 
supported by our empirical results. Table 4 presents the regression coefficients for 
the aggregated insider trading sample (both director and substantial shareholder 
trades). Models 1 and 2 use Analysts as the dependent variable, with Model 1 
controlling for the decreasing number of analysts via the time trend variable (Time) 
and Model 2 employing the three macroeconomic variables, dGDP, Confid and 
Market_Size. The results in Model 1 show the expected negative relationship 
between insiders and analysts which indicates that higher levels of insider trading are 
associated with lower levels of analyst following. This result is significant at the 
conventional 5% level after controlling for other diverse factors that affect analyst 
coverage. Size and Turnover are both positive and significant at the 1% level 
supporting the earlier conclusions based on correlation analysis and prior literature 
which found that analysts prefer large, liquid companies (Atiase, 1985; Freeman, 
1987; Bhushan, 1989; Dahlquist et al., 2003). The time trend variable is strongly 
negatively related to the dependent variable indicating that, over the sample period, 
analysts were becoming increasingly disinclined to follow New Zealand companies.  
Neither the number of independent board members (Indep) nor the percentage of 
institutional shareholders (Inst) had notable explanatory power despite the 
significance of earlier simple correlation coefficients. This may be explained by the 
cross-correlation relationships between Inst and Turnover as well as Indep and Size 
which suggests that the expected effect of these variables may already have been 
largely accounted for.  
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  Zero Inflated Poisson Model   Tobit Model 
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3  Model 4  
Constant  -1.3088 ***  -23.4162 ***  -3.1662 *** -5.1367 ** 
 (-0.3080)   (3.8047)   (0.2183)  (2.7840)  
INS -3.5254 **  -4.7210 **  -4.5302 ** -5.0444 *** 
 (1.7294)   (1.8804)   (1.7983)  (1.8257)  
Size 0.2564 ***  0.2723 ***  0.2822 *** 0.2837 *** 
 (0.0171)   (0.0160)   (0.0160)  (0.0159)  
Turnover 0.2940 ***  0.2726 ***  0.4112 *** 0.4012 *** 
 (0.0918)   (0.0840)   (0.0845)  (0.0837)  
Leverage -0.0107   -0.0088   -0.0080  -0.0083  
 (0.0225)   (0.0201)   (0.0110)  (0.0002)  
P/CF 0.0020   0.0014   0.0001  0.0000  
 (0.0015)   (0.0013)   (0.0002)  (0.0109)  
Inst 0.0006   0.0003   -0.0006  -0.0006  
 (0.0016)   (0.0016)   (0.0011)  (0.0010)  
Indep 0.1748   0.0606   0.1412  0.1330  
 (0.2745)   (0.2754)   (0.1392)  (0.1380)  
Time -0.1646 ***     -0.0238 **   
 (0.0177)      (0.0108)    
dGDP    0.0340     -0.2615  
    (2.3303)     (1.6635)  
Confid    0.0165 ***    0.0038 *** 
    (0.0020)     (0.0013)  
Market_Size    1.9644 ***    0.1706  
        (0.3529)          (0.2582)    
Tau 0.5142 ***  0.5945 ***      
 (0.1006)   (0.1103)       
Sigma       0.3729  0.3691  
Log Likelihood -764.1151   -762.4931     -210.6490  -207.3455    
Table 4: Determinants of Analyst Following with Aggregated Insider Trading 
 
Note – *** Significant at 1%,  ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 1% 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The sample comprises 464 firm-year 
observations. The dependent variable in Models 1 and 2 is Analysts defined as the 
number of analysts forecasts per company available at the end of the year.  The 
dependent variable in Models 3 and 4 is Analysts_F defined as the number of analysts 
forecasts available at year end as a percentage of the total number of analysts.  INS is 
the total volume of aggregated insider trading (directors and substantial shareholders 
trades) per firm-year divided by the total volume traded in that firm-year. Size is the 
natural logarithm of the average market value of equity during the firm-year. Turnover is 
measured as the volume traded in a firm-year divided by the average shares outstanding. 
Leverage is the debt to equity ratio at the end of the calendar year. P/CF is price divided 
by cash flow at the end of the calendar year. Inst is the percentage of shares held by 
institutional shareholders, defined as substantial shareholders, as per the Securities 
Market Act 1988, corrected for duplicate reported relevant interests. Indep is the 
percentage of the board of directors that are classified as non-executive or independent 
directors. Time is a time trend with 1997=1. dGDP is the annual percentage change in 
real GDP. Confid is the calendar year end value of the net business confidence index 
(%improve/rise - %worsen/decline). Market_Size is the natural logarithm of the calendar 
year end market capitalisation for all companies on the New Zealand Stock Exchange.  
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The results for Model 2 are virtually identical for INS, Size and Turnover. Of 
the macroeconomic variables Confid and Market_Size are both positively correlated 
with analyst following, again in line with expectations that analysts will be more active 
when the economy is booming and the market increases in size. The insignificance 
of the dGDP variable is possibly due to its effect being already accounted for with the 
Market_Size variable. Alternatively, investment advisors may be only concerned with 
the future, rather than current economy-wide fluctuations. Although not directly 
comparable between the Tobit and ZIP specifications, the log likelihood values 
indicate that the addition of the macroeconomic variables strengthens the models. 
 
The positive and statistically significant estimate of the τ parameter has an 
appealing economic interpretation. As was described in the methodology section, the 
ZIP specification assumes that the population is characterized by two regimes, one 
where the observations always take a value of zero and one where the values follow 
a Poisson distribution. With τ > 0 the likelihood of being in the “never to be analyzed” 
regime is inversely related to the Poisson mean λ. Consequently, it means that the 
companies with high levels of insider activity can bear a stigma and be collectively 
avoided by all market professionals.  
 
The results in Model 3 and 4 utilize the same variable specifications as the 
previous models with the replacement of Analysts_F as the dependent variable. Due 
to the nature of the regressant, a left-censored at zero and right-censored at one, 
Tobit regressions are employed. The results for both specifications corroborate the 
earlier finding of a significantly negative relationship between Analysts and INS with 
Model 4 at the 1% level. The log market value of equity and the liquidity proxy still 
remain relevant determinants in the regressions. Furthermore, since the analyst 
following has been scaled by the total number of analysts active in the New Zealand 
market, one would expect Analysts_F not to be strongly procyclical. The estimates in 
Table 4 confirm this intuition; the coefficient of Market_Size became insignificant and 
the slope of the business confidence variable decreased in magnitude.   
 
The results in Table 3, which lend further credence to the earlier findings of 
Eterbari et al. (2003), show that directors are able to trade more profitably than 
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substantial shareholders. Given this difference in profitability of differing insider 
classes we separate out the sample by insider type to examine whether this has an 
impact on the relationship with analysts. The crowding out hypothesis suggests that 
analysts are worried about the possibility of trading against an insider for 
informational reasons, as in this situation the analysts expected return will be 
reduced and the costs of gathering their information will not be recovered. However, 
insider trading impacts on the expected returns of analysts in at least two ways. First, 
analysts’ ability to profit from acquiring information is reduced when an insider’s trade 
is disclosed as the disclosure corrects the price, removing unpriced information from 
the market. The other cost is that of trading against an insider, in which case the 
informed outsider will suffer trading costs. As shown from the cumulative abnormal 
returns, an analyst trading against a director stands to lose more than when they 
trade against a substantial shareholder. However, in terms of ongoing information 
asymmetry, because director trades are not disclosed promptly there exists a 
continued opportunity to profit from information collection. The exact nature of the 
relationship between analysts and the different classes of insiders will therefore 
depend on the relative importance of these differing factors reducing the expected 
returns to informed outsiders.  
 
To test the impact of the class of insider on the crowding out hypothesis, we 
replace the previous measure of insider trading intensity (INS) with three variables 
measuring the trading intensity of substantial shareholders (SUB), directors (DIR) 
and a lag of the directors trade (LDIR). The lagged measure was included to account 
for directors’ disclosing in the annual report meaning that the market was unable to 
observe their trading until the next financial year. These measures were constructed 
in the same fashion as the INS measure but included only the trades in a year from 
the relevant class of insider. 
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  Zero Inflated Poisson Model   Tobit Model 
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3  Model 4  
Constant  -1.2261 ***  -23.0047 ***  -3.1454 *** -5.2333 * 
 (0.3177)   (3.8683)   (0.2232)  (2.8577)  
SUB -0.9502 **  -1.0824 ***  -0.8074 *** -0.8637 *** 
 (0.4146)   (0.3568)   (0.2778)  (0.2787)  
DIR 0.0741   -0.1403   -0.2630  -0.3127  
 (0.6419)   (0.5926)   (0.3496)  (0.3495)  
LDIR 0.0757   0.2292   -0.2500  -0.2468  
 (1.1176)   (1.2100)   (0.3324)  (0.3300)  
Size 0.2536 ***  0.2730 ***  0.2824 *** 0.2839 *** 
 (0.0182)   (0.0170)   (0.0165)  (0.0164)  
Turnover 0.2794 ***  0.2507 ***  0.4035 *** 0.3954 *** 
 (0.1037)   (0.0963)   (0.0857)  (0.0853)  
Leverage -0.0096   -0.0073   -0.0071  -0.0071  
 (0.0225)   (0.0206)   (0.0111)  (0.0110)  
P/CF 0.0015   0.0005   0.0000  0.0000  
 (0.0014)   (0.0009)   (0.0001)  (0.0001)  
Inst 0.0006   0.0002   -0.0004  -0.0003  
 (0.0017)   (0.0016)   (0.0011)  (0.0011)  
Indep 0.1158   0.0116   0.1105  0.1003  
 (0.2872)   (0.2825)   (0.1440)  (0.1430)  
Time -0.1608 ***     -0.0242 ***   
 (0.0183)      (0.0111)    
dGDP    0.8251     0.5821  
    (2.4338)     (1.7196)  
Confid    0.0163 ***    0.0039 *** 
    (0.0021)     (0.0013)  
Market_Size    1.9300 ***    0.1792  
        (0.3593)          (0.2650)    
Tau 0.5156 ***   0.6094 ***           
 (0.1053)   (0.1172)       
Sigma       0.3722  0.3690  
Log Likelihood -723.2960   -721.5494   -198.5178  -195.8237   
Table 5: Determinants of Analyst Following with Differing Insider Classifications  
 
Note – *** Significant at 1%,  ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 1% 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The sample comprises 443 firm-year observations. The dependent 
variable in Models 1 and 2 is Analysts defined as the number of analysts forecasts per company available at 
the end of the year.  The dependent variable in Models 3 and 4 is Analysts_F defined as the number of 
analysts forecasts available at year end as a percentage of the total number of analysts. Sub is the total 
volume of substantial shareholder trades per firm-year divided by the total volume traded in that firm-year. Dir 
is the total volume of director trades per firm-year divided by the total volume traded in that firm-year. LDir is 
the total volume of director trades per firm-year divided by the total volume traded in the previous firm-year. 
Size is the natural logarithm of the average market value of equity during the firm-year. Turnover is measured 
as the volume traded in a firm-year divided by the average shares outstanding. Leverage is the debt to equity 
ratio at the end of the calendar year. P/CF is price divided by cash flow at the end of the calendar year. Inst is 
the percentage of shares held by institutional shareholders, defined as substantial shareholders, as per the 
Securities Market Act 1988, corrected for duplicate reported relevant interests. Indep is the percentage of the 
board of directors that are classified as non-executive or independent directors. Time is a time trend with 
1997=1. dGDP is the annual percentage change in real GDP. Confid is the calendar year end value of the net 
business confidence index (%improve/rise - %worsen/decline). Market_Size is the natural logarithm of the 
calendar year end market capitalisation for all companies on the New Zealand Stock Exchange.  
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Table 5 presents the results for the regressions rerun with the sample split by 
class of insider. The measure of substantial shareholder trading (SUB) is highly 
significant in all four models. Curiously, the contemporaneous and lagged values of 
director trading (DIR and LDIR) have no impact on analyst following, despite the fact 
that an outside investor trading against a director stands to lose the most. Principal 
shareholders who make only marginally profitable deals, however, have a 
significantly negative impact on the number of analysts examining companies. This 
seems to indicate that it is the impact on informational asymmetry which is the key 
factor. As discussed above, the requirement that substantial shareholders disclose in 
a timely fashion, in conjunction with their superior ability to price the securities of the 
company they are involved with, means that whenever they trade new information is 
revealed to the market. The result is that any effort to gather extra information is 
wasted and given the cost in terms of time and resources it stands to reason that 
analysts would reduce their coverage when there is little hidden information to be 
found. The delay in disclosure for directors, however, means unpriced information 
remains undetected by the market and therefore can still be collected and used 
profitably (Zhang, 2001). It is interesting, however, that as neither of the director 
variables are significant the risk of trading against a director does not seem to be a 
concern for investment advisors, or as is more likely, the cost of trading against a 
director is outweighed by the continued opportunities to collect and profit from 
unpriced information. This means that provided the analyst is trading in the same 
direction as the director, their expected returns should not be significantly reduced 
giving them the incentive to expend resources searching out new information that the 
majority of the market still does not have. The insignificant reaction to the lagged 
director trading variable suggests that analysts believe last years trading is unrelated 
to the possibility of trading against a director in the current year.  
 
The end result of either explanation is that the market inefficiently allocates 
resources as the information that should have been conveyed to the market via the 
insider trading remains hidden and analysts expend valuable resources trying to find 
it. Further, given the importance of accurate securities prices for resource allocation, 
less efficient prices resulting either from hidden information or from a reduction in the 
number of analysts directly impact on the efficacy of the market in fulfilling its 
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function. This supports the policy that insider trading should be disclosed promptly to 
improve the informational efficiency of the markets. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this paper was to examine the interactions between insiders and 
analysts in the context of the New Zealand market which is largely perceived to have 
relatively lenient insider trading regulations. Under the Security Markets Act 1988 and 
the Securities Market Amendment Act 2002 there is no criminal liability for 
exploitation of material non-public information. The enforcement of civil sanctions can 
be also called into question as, to date, there has not been a single successful 
prosecution of insider trading charges.3 The results presented in this study 
substantiate that trading by directors and principal shareholders in this market is 
pervasive as the transactions of individuals subject to mandatory disclosure 
requirements make up a large proportion of the total NZX trading volume. Insiders 
also tend to exploit the investing public by using the private information they posses 
in security trading. The magnitude and significance of abnormal returns that occur 
subsequent to insiders’ shareholding changes are in sharp conflict with the strong 
form of the efficient market hypothesis. On average, the cumulative market-adjusted 
return accruing to an insider within 200 days of his or her transaction exceeds 5%, 
with the directors earning over 6.8% and substantial shareholders reaping about 
1.6%. The difference in profitability between the two considered groups may derive 
either from the two-tier disclosure regime that persisted in New Zealand or from the 
proximity with company operations.  
 
As was argued in Fishman and Hagerty (1992) and Khanna, Slezak, and 
Bradley (1994), presence of insiders creates a hazardous investment environment in 
which outsiders are reluctant to collect and evaluate costly information. In a round of 
trading against an issuer’s affiliated person the losses can be considerable and the 
information gathering efforts become wasted. Furthermore, promptly disclosed 
insider trading reduces the extent of informational asymmetry in the market, which 
further lowers the expected benefits of outsiders’ private information search. As a 
consequence, analysts, who invest either on their own or on behalf of their clients, 
are expected to be crowded out by insiders. To assess the empirical validity of this 
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assertion we inquire into the relationship between the firm-level insider trading and 
the number of earnings forecasts provided by market professionals. This paper 
presents compelling evidence that companies with high level of aggregate insider 
dealing have ceteris paribus lower analyst coverage. 
 
An intriguing finding was that analyst following was more severely reduced in 
response to substantial shareholder trading rather than director trading. This result 
can be ascribed to a relatively unique characteristic of the New Zealand regulatory 
framework. Until recently substantial shareholder, those with more than 5% of the 
company voting rights were required to disclose details of their trades within 5 
working days of the transaction, while directors could defer their reporting until the 
year end. Prompt disclosure means little information remains hidden and analysts, 
who cannot earn sufficient profit from informational asymmetry, devote fewer 
resources to equity research. Delayed trades however do not correct securities 
prices quickly allowing analysts an opportunity to profit.  Thus, in light of our results, 
the recently enacted Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in the U.S. and Securities Market 
Amendment Act 2002 in New Zealand which shortened the reporting deadlines for 
corporate insiders can be deemed vital for the functioning of the capital markets as 
they aim at promoting price efficiency and better resource allocation.  
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ENDNOTES 
1. The decline in the number of analysts seems to be due to the withdrawal of a number of 
investment banks from the New Zealand market resulting in a decrease in the number of local 
analysts.  
2. The profitability of self-reported insider transactions has been examined in the U.S. (Finnerty, 
1976; Seyhun, 1986; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001), Canada (Baesel and Stein, 1979), Spain 
(Del Brio, Miguel and Perote, 2002), Poland (Wisniewski and Bohl, 2004) and U.K. (Pope et 
al., 1990; Friederich et al., 2002). 
3. While Kerry Hoggard, CEO of Fletcher Forests, was prosecuted, the judge directed it to be 
settled out of court. The settlement however was less than the minimum punishment likely to 
have been imposed by the court. 
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